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Our first reaction to Jones and Smith (1993) reminds us of  the classic paper  in 
social psychology,  "They Saw a Game:  A Case Study,"  in which Hastorf  and 
Cantril  (1954) reported striking differences between Dartmouth and Yale stu- 
dents '  perceptions of  a hotly contested Dar tmouth-Yale  football  game. The 
present c i rcumstances are different in that understanding the development  of  
cogni t ion is anything but a game. Furthermore,  we had thought that all of  us 
were on the same team! Nonetheless ,  Jones and Smith see infractions where we 
see none, and sprinkled among their descript ions that we agree with were state- 
ments that made us cry "foul!"  We do not imagine,  however,  that truth can be 
readily refereed. Therefore,  our goal  will not be to tally our grievances but rather 
to outl ine the different perspect ives  from which we approach the issue o f  concep- 
tual development .  We begin by underl ining points of  agreement .  Then we shift to 
our point of  view on the work descr ibed and cri t icized by Jones and Smith.  
Finally,  we hope to converge on some critical issues that motivate the research 
agenda.  
Points of  A g r e e m e n t  
Jones and Smith see conflict  and contrast  between their results and those of  our 
own.  They seem to suggest  that, because we propose that nonobvious features 
are important ,  we are c la iming that obvious features are unimportant.  Not so. We 
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are instead struck by the commonalitics bctween the two approaches. Both lines 
of research stress the Iollowing: (a) Perception. language, and conceptual knowl- 
edge mutually interact to determine task pertbrmancc; (b) there is no simple 
developmental shift from perception to conception: (c) children do not reason 
about categories using a simple, context-free similarity metric: and (d) different 
categorization tasks lead to use of different kinds of information. 
Both lines of research demonstrate that concepts are not unidimensional or 
fixed, but rather are multidimensional and open to restructuring. Both suggest 
that children may grasp the complex implications of perceptual features, and 
both suggest that the semantics of even familiar common nouns are not as 
obvious and uncontroversial as assumed on traditional accounts. Let us briefly 
expand on what Jones and Smith refer to as the "nonperceptual" view. Studies of 
induction have shown that, in addition to reliance on the category name, children 
attend to: (a) perceptual properties, making more inductions when within- 
category similarity is high than when it is not (Gelman, 1988: Florian, 1992: 
Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, Lopez, & Shafir. 1990): (b) the semantics of the 
property being taught (Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Markman, 1986; Shipley, 
1988); (c) category level (Gelman & O'Reilly, 1988): (d) ontological kind (Gel- 
man & O'Reilly, 1988: Kalish & Gelman, 1992; Keil. 1989): (e) category struc- 
ture (Davidson & Gelman, 1990); (f) category familiarity (Davidson & Gelman, 
1990); and (g) (perhaps) syntactic information (Gelman & Coley, 1991: Kalish & 
Gelman, in press). The point from studies of induction is not that naming draws 
attention away from perception; indeed, ordinarily it does not (see Gelman & 
Coley, 1991; Medin, 1989: Medin & Ortony, 1989). Thus, we all seem to agree 
that conceptual development involves the interactive influences of perception, 
language, and conceptual knowledgc. 
How, if we agree on so much, can we be characterized as agreeing so little? In 
part this may be that the claim that concepts, perception, and language interact is 
not yet specified with sufficient rigor to allow one to detect if it is receiving 
support. We also suspect that within this broad framework there is room for a 
variety of perspectives, perspectives that can lead to very distinctive slants on the 
same issues. To outline our point of view we must turn to the broader question of 
what functions concepts serve. 
Conceptual Functions 
Concepts function in enormously varied ways. They can be used for extremely 
rapid identification (as when escaping from prey), organizing information effi- 
ciently in memory, problem-solving, analogizing, drawing inductive inferences 
that extend knowledge beyond what is known, embodying and imparting ideo- 
logical beliefs, conveying aesthetic materials (e.g., metaphor, poetry), and so 
forth. These are different kinds of judgments that partake of different kinds of 
information. People rely strongly on perceptual similarity with some sorts of 
judgments, but focus on nonperceptual features more with others. One might 
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expect beliefs about essences to figure more prominently in judgments associated 
with Frank Keil's (1989) transtormation experinaents than in run-of-the-mill ob- 
ject recognition. In short, conceptual functions go beyond categorization. 
One potential source of our differing perspectives is that different investiga- 
tors focus on different conceptual functions, and often researchers fail to clarify 
which function is under study. Jones and Smith stress the identification function 
of concepts. In fact, they define "concept" as the represented structure "that 
allows members of a category to be recognized" (p. 114). We find this definition 
overly narrow. For example, interpreting novel conceptual combinations such as 
paper bee (presumably a bee made out of paper) or paper committee (presumably 
a committee concerned with paper but not made of it) is not a simple matter of 
conjoining two recognition functions (Downing, 1977; Medin & Shoben, 1988; 
Murphy, 1988). Nor is it clear that recognition routines reveal much about 
relations between concepts, a common concern in semantic analyses. 
Different Slants 
With all of the varied functions that categories serve, it is no wonder that the 
study of concepts cannot be distinguished from the study of the other kinds of 
information and cognitive systems they interact with. That being so, a critical 
issue is how to think about and perform experiments that describe the interplay of 
these factors. Smith and Jones suggest that the role of perceptual knowledge in 
concept formation and use has been systematically neglected and underesti- 
mated. In their view, when perceptual similarity has been contrasted with con- 
ceptual knowledge, the stimulus materials have been "highly impoverished" and, 
for that reason, the associated results have underestimated the importance of 
perceptual similarity in more normal, rich input conditions. We question several 
fundamental aspects of this view. 
1. Comparing Perception with Knowledge? Our first point of disagreement 
is this: We do not think that asking about the relative importance of perceptual 
knowledge versus other torrns of knowledge is a particularly meaningful ques- 
tion. The Gelman and Markman (1986, 1987) studies were aimed at the question 
of whether category membership information contributed to children's inductions 
in a manner that could not simply be attributed to perceptual similarity. The logic 
of this question about category membership dictates that perceptual similarity be 
held constant or biased against the hypothesis of interest. It is simply incorrect to 
suggest that these studies attempted to evaluate the relative importance of percep- 
tion and conceptual knowledge to induction. If concept development and use 
reflect an interaction of perceptual knowledge, language, and conceptual knowl- 
edge, then it does not seem sensible to try to evaluate the relative magnitude of 
main effects. 
It is also important to bear in mind the context for the original studies by 
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Gelman and Markman. Their work was in part designed to counter the view that 
perceptual similarity, uncontaminated by conceptual knowledge, is sufficient to 
account for the development of categorization. Their studies were designed to 
demonstrate that perceptual experience (more traditionally, stimulus generaliza- 
tion) is not the only factor controlling young children's reasoning about catego- 
ries. Gelman and Markman showed that young children could use knowledge 
about category membership--even when it was pitted against perceptual similar- 
i t y - a s  the basis for inferring other (hidden) properties. 
2. Distorted Stimuli? It is incorrect to suggest that Gelman and Markman 
"distorted" similarities so that they did not coincide well with category member- 
ship. All items used in their studies of familiar categories were actual things that 
exist and pose a conflict between name and overall appearance (as rated by 
subjects). Legless "lizards" really do exist; "whales" actually resemble "fish"; 
flying "bats" are confusable with flying "blackbirds," and so forth (quotes indi- 
cate the words used in the experiments). Indeed, the stimulus pictures were 
sufficiently realistic and accurate that adults were frequently able to identify them 
in the absence of experimenter labels and drew category-based inferences accord- 
ingly (Gelman & Coley, 1990). Even 4-year-old children were able to identify a 
subset of the animals when no labels were provided (Gelman & Markman, 
1987). 
3. Impoverished Stimuli? Demonstrations of category-based induction and 
essentialism rely on a wide variety of evidence, with stimuli ranging from line 
drawings to realistic color drawings to photographs of actual things. Gelman 
(1988) and Gelman and O'Reilly (1988), using photographs, found that children 
drew inferences to dissimilar category members. Gelman and Wellman (1991), 
using photographs, found evidence for a kind of psychological essentialism in 
preschool children. Rosengren, Gelman, Kalish, and McCormick (1991) em- 
ployed photographs and realistic color drawings, and found that children assume 
that identity remains constant over growth, even when color change or meta- 
morphosis occurs (see also Keil, 1989). Children's adherence to psychological 
essentialism cannot be explained simply as an artifact of deficient stimuli. 
As a related point, Jones and Smith suggest that studies showing evidence of 
essentialism relied on pictures that were so "deeply impoverished" that by default 
children were forced to rely on the labels provided by the experimenter. The 
problem with this argument is that children did not uniformly rely on the labels. 
Control conditions were included in which pictures were named, but children did 
not use the names because the inferences were inappropriate (Davidson & Gel- 
man, 1990; Gelman, 1988; Gelman & Coley, 1991; Gelman & Markman, 1986, 
1987; Gelman & O'Reilly, 1988). Other conditions included pictures that were 
not named, however; subjects did use the names because they were able to detect 
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the category on the basis of subtle perceptual cues (Gelman & Coley, 1991; 
Gclman & Markman. 1987). 
Wc are also puzzled by the argument that in the induction studies names 
provide obviously better clues than do pictures, but also that names are uninfor- 
mative with respect to ontological type (e.g., that a toy bear is a bear). If the 
latter point is valid, then how would children know to make inferences based on 
names in Gclman and Markman's studies? What would prevent them from gener- 
alizing novel biological properties from real bears to toy bears'? (We already 
know from Carey, 1985, that children do not draw inferences from a real animal 
to a toy animal.) 
A final point in this regard is that category learning often takes place with- 
out direct (perceptual) experience. Children learn from syntactic information 
(Naigles, Gleitman, & Gleitman, in press), folktales, verbal instructions, and so 
forth. Although it would be interesting to vary the richness of the stimuli em- 
ployed in these studies, and to determine how sensitive children are to subtle 
perceptual cues concerning category membership, the point remains that much of 
children's learning derives fi'om picture books, bedtime stories, conversations, 
and other similar situations with "impoverished" visual information. 
4. Disrespect for Perceptual Knowledge? Jones and Smith argue that per- 
ceptual knowledge has been denigrated--treated as insignificant, or as inferior to 
tile deeper sort of knowledge associated with naive theories and essentialist 
ideas. Again, we have a different slant. First, in Gelman and Markman's work, 
one motivation for including perceptual similarity as a contrast to category mem- 
bership (as conveyed by names), was precisely to capitalize on the demonstrated 
power and significance of perceptual similarity to children. It is well known that 
children arc highly attentive to perceptual cues. If this were not true, then there 
would be no reason to use general appearance as a contrast in that work. 
Second, we view the study of essentialism as attempting to discover the 
linkages between perceptual infornlation and knowledge and beliefs. There are 
some deep issues and subtle problems associated with the most straightforward 
ways of integrating perceptually-driven and theory-based category learning (e.g., 
Wisniewski & Medin, 1991): we don't think that investigators in this area are at 
all guilty of ignoring perceptual knowledge. 
A third point, however, is that there are important and systematic differences 
across studies in task and items, making it not very surprising that children attend 
to different kinds of information on one versus the other. Shape-bias studies ask 
children to categorize: induction studies ask children to make inferences. These 
are very different tasks that (normatively) take into account different kinds of 
information (see discussion in Gelman, Collman, & Maccoby, 1986). Moreover, 
shape-bias studies typically include nonmeaningful stimuli with no hidden prop- 
erties. Indeed, the only kinds of intbrmation available to children on many of 
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these tasks were perceptual. Children would have to use perception on the shape 
tasks, in order to categorize at all. 
5. What Drives Attention? One piece that seems to be missing from the 
Jones and Smith account is what the engine might be that could drive children to 
attend to shape, color, texture, or any other feature. Induction studies and the 
psychological essentialism perspective are valuable for reminding us of category 
function. Why do we classify as we do and not in other ways? One answer is that 
our categories are structured in part to foster induction, especially about proper- 
ties not immediately discernible. Indeed, even the shape-bias results can be 
explained in these terms. That is, shape is probably a good predictor of other 
important properties (including internal parts, function, behavior, etc.). (See also 
Medin & Ortony, 1989, for a discussion of how appearance is thought to be a 
guide to underlying properties.) 
Stability, Coherence, and Representation 
Are concepts represented? What could it mean to say that concepts are not 
represented'? If the point is that representations are meaningless to talk about 
without specifying associated processing principles, we quite agree. One cannot 
equate stability with fixed representations. Stability can arise from reliable com- 
putations, and instability can arise from instable computations on stable repre- 
sentations (e.g., Barsalou, 1991; Medin & Schaffer, 1978). Indeed, a cardinal 
rule in cognitive psychology is that one can evaluate pairs of representation and 
processing assumptions, but not either entity in isolation. 
Moreover, if the point is that categories and word meanings are fluid, contex- 
tually sensitive, and changing over time, we also agree. Jones and Smith provide 
interesting demonstrations of this point, as do many philosophers, linguists, and 
psychologists (Clark & Clark, 1977; Katz, 1964: Maloney & Gelman, 1987; 
Nelson, 1974). Nonetheless, categories are stable as well as fluid. We argue that 
a complete account of categorization must be able to address both stability and 
fluidity (see also Barsalou, 1987). Induction studies examine stability, in part 
reflecting the phenomenon that some concepts are lexicalized. Language is an 
important tool for fixing reference (at least for some time), and for concretizing 
the experience of past generations. 
One corollary to the relative stability of language may be the assumption of 
category essences. It is important to clarify what is meant by "essentialism." 
Psychological essentialism is a claim about folk metaphysics--beliefs about how 
the world is structured. An essentialist assumption is a realist assumption, that 
categories are discovered rather than invented. Thus, psychological essentialism 
is a claim about people's (often implicit) belief systems. Essentialist assumptions 
appear to be common across history and across cultures. Essentialist beliefs 
appear to emerge in biology (Mayr, 1988), folk systematics (Arran, 1990), and 
everyday social concepts (Rothbart & Taylor, in press; Stoler, in press). 
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It is important to be clear about what psychological essentialism is not: It is 
not a metaphysical claim about the structure of the world, it is not a claim about 
the structure of concepts, and it is not a claim about the structure of word 
meanings. Beliefs are not the same as category structure. Indeed, according to 
current biological theorizing, essentialist beliefs about the concept of species 
may be wrong (Mayr. 1988; albeit very useful in supporting inductions about 
hidden (nonperceptual) properties). Essences are typically not known, almost 
always unobservable, and may not exist. So, the essence itself cannot usually 
serve as the basis of how people categorize or identify items. Indeed, Medin and 
Ortony (1989) suggest that often there may only be an essence "placeholder." 
Rey (1983) has argued that one needs something like a "node" to provide for 
concept stability within and across people, and an essence placeholder is perfect- 
ly suited to perform that function. 
Perceptual Imperialism? 
The Jones and Smith analysis is valuable for forcing one to address questions 
about where perception leaves off and where conception begins. We agree that 
the sort of fuzziness that allows one factor to usurp an inappropriate explanatory 
role must be avoided. Jones and Smith appear to be worried that perception is not 
getting its fair share of credit, whereas we see a perceptual imperialism that may 
be stretching beyond its proper role. Indeed, if perceptual knowledge is asked to 
carry too much explanatory weight, it may end up paradoxically being unable to 
perform the role traditionally associated with it. 
What do we mean by perception or appearance'? Although certain types of 
perceptual experiences such as stereopsis evolve over time (many seconds), 
normally we think of perception as relatively immediate and direct in the sense 
that it is not mediated by reasoning or conscious computations. Sometimes 
people are made aware of perceptual experience by its occasional contrast with 
reality. For example, in the Mueller-Lyer illusion we see lines of unequal length 
that other computations (employing a ruler) indicate are equal in length, contrary 
to appearances. Why do we believe the ruler'? In part, it is because we have a set 
of interconnected beliefs about rigid objects and procedures associated with 
measuring things, beliefs that have been reinforced by prior experience. Note, 
however, that this conceptual knowledge does not cause the Mueller-Lyer illu- 
sion to disappear--certain aspects of perceptual experience are impenetrable to 
certain forms of conceptual knowledge. This division of labor has the advantage 
of enabling us to overcome our expectations and beliefs when they conflict with 
reality. 
Smith and Jones make the provocative and important point that perceptual 
similarity may be dynamic rather than fixed. It is provocative because it raises 
the possibility that similarity is "smarter" than we think, and that some of the 
contrasts between similarity and other forms of knowledge may have used an 
inappropriate assessment of similarity. The form of dynamism they suggest in- 
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volves a differential weighting of constituent features or dimensions and is nicely 
illustrated in their Figures 3, 4, and 5 (pp. 131, 133, and 135, respectively). In 
these figures they show how the Landau, Smith, and Jones (1988) results could 
be accommodated by assuming that a linguistic context increases the weight or 
significance of form features over other properties such as color or texture. That 
is to say, the effects of language can be thought of as mediated by a dynamic 
perceptual system that computes perceptual similarity in a flexible manner. 
The idea that (the computation of) similarity is not fixed is a very intriguing 
avenue for exploring interactions between language, perception, and knowledge. 
Evidence suggesting that young children are less flexible about similarity than 
older children can be interpreted as showing that the perceptual system's conser- 
vatism serves to protect young children from forming the wrong categories 
(Medin, 1983). Smith (1989) showed that a formal model for this and related 
changes with age could account for a wide range of developmental findings. 
Jones and Smith extend this earlier view by suggesting that perceptual similarity 
is still more dynamic. 
We believe that it is at least worth asking if the dynamic perceptual similarity 
described by Jones and Smith is still perceptual. We think the evidence from 
Landau et al. (1988) and related studies shows that the significance of different 
dimensions does change powerfully as a function of linguistic versus nonlinguis- 
tic contexts. A central question, however, is whether changes in the weighting of 
dimensions correspond to changes in perceptual experience. The Jones and Smith 
view seems to be that perceptual experience does change to reflect the difference 
in dimensional weighting. If so, then the implication that linguistic contexts 
dynamically determine perceptual experience raises some intriguing empirical 
questions that should be explored. Although we remain agnostic on this issue, we 
should point out the logical possibility that the change in weighting is the result 
of a slower, more conscious and deliberate weighting and ignoring of different 
aspects of the situation. To establish that contexts change perceptual experience, 
independent evidence is needed to separate strategic weighting from direct 
changes in perception. 
If similarity is dynamically computed, then there is no single perceptual 
similarity that a comparison really has; there is only a space of possible sim- 
ilarities under different conditions. Why is this important? For us it is significant 
for limiting the imperialism of perceptual similarity. Note, however, that there 
are dangers of having perception be too penetrable--it risks having us see the 
world in accordance with our beliefs. We can live with rose-colored glasses; 
opaque glasses are more problematic, 
We confess to being uncertain about how willing Jones and Smith are to link 
changes in dimension weights with changes in perceptual experience. It may be 
that they think of perceptual experience as being more stable, with dimensional 
weighting being more conceptual in character. In any event, one would like to 
have an account of the role of perceptual experience in concept formation and 
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use. It would bc odd indeed if Jones and Smith thought of perceptual experience 
as irrelevant. 
Finally, we fccl wc should add a footnote to the discussion of perception and 
similarity. Similarity theorists have not and should not necessarily restrict them- 
selves to perceptual similarity. Conceptual knowledge also provides the basis for 
similarity. Furthermore, researchers such as Gentner (1983, 1989) have drawn 
the important distinction between attributional and relational similarity and have 
shown that they serve somewhat different functions in accessing knowledge and 
applying it. Thus the dialogue between similarity-based and knowledge-driven 
learning is both more complicated and more enriched than is implied by the 
simple distinction between perception and conception. 
CONCLUSION 
We end with the reminder that human categorization is extraordinarily varied and 
diverse (see also Waxman, 1991). Humans use a wide array of different kinds of 
concepts that vary in structure, content, linguistic expression, duration, and 
origins--concepts ranging from red to quark, from hypotenuse to game. from 
oak tree to justice, Inextricably tied to this variation is variation in the functions 
that concepts serve. We all seem to agree that studying concepts entails studying 
the contexts of their use, in all of their linguistic, perceptual, and conceptual 
intricacies. However, if we are to explain this variation and do more than de- 
scribe (or celebrate) its complexity, it is necessary to examine how the functions 
and structures of categories vary systematically. We believe it is fruitful to ask, 
for example, how and why induction and identification lead to focus on different 
kinds of information; how and why concepts named by adjectives tend to differ in 
structure and function from those named by nouns; how and why a concept that 
has been encoded in language and then passed down from generation to genera- 
tion (e.g., "dog") may include different kinds of information and yield different 
kinds of performance than a concept newly invented for the purpose of an 
experiment (e.g., an abstract shape made out of wire or wood). In short, there are 
ample motivations for treating concepts as more than recognition routines. 
REFERENCES 
Atran, S. (1990). CognitiveJbundations of naturul histoo,: Towards an anthropology of science. New 
York: Cambridgc University Press. 
Barsalou, L.W. (1987), The instability of graded structure: hnplications for the nature of concepts. In 
U. Neisser (Ed.), Concepts alr¢t conceptual development: Ecological and intellectual factors 
in categorization tPP. 101-140). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Barsalou, L.W, (I 991). Dcriving categorics to achieve goals. In G.H. Bower (Ed.). The psychology 
of learning amt motivation. I/ol. 27. New York: Academic. 
Carcy, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books. 
Clark. H.H., & Clark, E.V. (1977). P.2vchology and language. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jov- 
anovich. 
166 Susan A. Gelman and Douglas L. Medin 
Davidson, N.S., & Gelman, S.A. (1990). Inductions from novel categories: The role of language and 
conceptual structure. Cognitive DevehJpment, 5, 151 - 176. 
Downing, P. (1977). On the creation and use of English compound nouns. Language, 53, 810-842. 
Florian, J. (I 992). Stripes do not a zebra make, or do tho~? Coneeptual and perceptual information 
in inductive inference. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. 
Gelman, S.A. (1988). The development of induction within natural kind and artifact categories. 
Cognitive Psycholog); 20, 65-95. 
Gelman, S.A., & Coley, J.D. (1990). The importance of knowing a dodo is a bird: Categories and 
inferences in 2-year-old children. Developmental Psychology, 26, 796-804. 
Gelman, S.A., & Coley, J.D. (1991). Language and categorization: The acquisition of natural kind 
terms. In S.A. Gelman & J.P. Bymes (Eds.), Perspectives on language and thought: Inter- 
relations in development (pp. 146-196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gelman. S.A., Collman, P., & Maccoby, E.E. (1986). Inferring properties from categories versus 
inferring categories from properties: The case of gender. ChiM Development, 57, 396-404, 
Gelman, S.A., & Markman, E.M. (1986). Categories and induction in young children. Cognition, 
23, 183-209. 
Gehnan, S.A., & Markman, E.M. (1987). Young children's inductions from natural kinds: The role 
of categories and appearances. Child Development, 58, 1532-1541. 
Gelman, S.A., & O'Reilly, A.W. (1988). Children's inductive inferences within superordinate cate- 
gories: The role of language and category structure. Child Development, 59, 876-887. 
Gelman, S.A., & Wellman, H.M. (1991). Insides and essences: Early understandings of the nonob- 
vious. Cognition, 38, 213-244. 
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 
155-170. 
Genmer, D. (1989). The mechanisms of analogical reasoning. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), 
Similarity and analogical reasoning. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Hastorf, A.H., & Cantril, H. (1954). They saw a game: A case study. Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, 49, 129- t 34. 
Jones, S.S., & Smith, L.B. (1993). The place of perception in children's concepts. Cognitive 
Development, 8, 113-139. 
Kalish, C.W., & Gelman, S.A. (1992): On wooden pillows: Young children's understanding of 
category implications. Child Development, 63, 1536-1557. 
Katz, J.J. (1964). Semantic theory and the meaning of "good.'" The Journal of Philosophy, LXI, 739- 
766. 
Keil, F.C. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Landau, B., Smith, L.B., & Jones, S.S. (1988). The importance of shape in early lexical learning. 
Cognitive Development, 3, 299-321. 
Maloney, L.T., & Gelman, S.A. (1987). Measuring the influence of context: The interpretation of 
dimensional adjectives. Language and Cognitive Processes. 2, 205-215. 
Mayr, E. (1988). Toward a new philosophy of biology: Observations of an evolutionist. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Medin, D.L. (1983). Structural principles in categorization. In T.J. Tighe & B.E. Shepp (Eds.), 
Perception, cognition, and development: Interactional analysis (pp. 203-230). Hillsdale, N J: 
Erlbaum. 
Medin, D.L. (1989). Concepts and conceptual structure. American Psychologist, 44, 1469-1481. 
Medin, D.L., & Ortony, A. C1989). Psychological essentialism. In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (Eds.), 
Similarity and analogical reasoning (pp. 179-195). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Medin, D.L., & Schaffer, M.M. (1978). A context theory of classification learning. Psychological 
Review, 85, 207-238. 
Medin, D.L., & Shoben, E.J. (1988). Context and structure in conceptual combination. Cognitive 
Psychology 20, 158-190. 
Murphy, G.L. (1988). Comprehending complex concepts. Cognitive Science, 12, 529-562. 
Concepls, Language, and Perception 167 
Naigles, L.G., Gleitman, H., & Gleitman, L.R. (1993). Children acquire word meaning components 
from syntactic evidence. In E. Dromi (Ed.), Language and cognition: A developmental 
perspective (pp. 104-140). Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Nelson, K. (1974). Concept, word, and sentence: Interrelationships in acquisition and development. 
Psychological Review, 81, 267-285. 
Osherson, D.N., Smith, E.E., Wilkie, O.. Lopez, A., & Shafir, E. (1990), Category-based induc- 
tion. Psychological Review 97, 185-200. 
Rey, G. (1983). Concepts and stereotypes. Cognition, 15, 237-262. 
Rosengren, K., Gelman, S.A., Kalish, C., & McCormick, M. (1991). As time goes by: Children's 
early understanding of biological growth. Child Development, 62, 1302-1320. 
Rothbart, M., & Taylor, M. (in press). Category labels and social reality: Do we view social 
categories as natural kinds? In K. Fiedler & J.R. Semin (Eds.), Language and social cogni- 
tion. 
Shipley, E.F. (1988, June). 7~t,o types of hierarchies: Class inclusion hierarchies and kind hier- 
archies. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Piaget Society, Philadelphia, PA. 
Smith, L.B. (1989). A model of perceptual classification in children and adults. Psychological 
Review 96, 125-144. 
Stoler, A. (in press). Children on the colonial divide: Sentiment and citizenship in colonial Southeast 
Asia. In G. Eley (Ed.), Power: Thinking through the disciplines. Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Waxman, S.R. ( 1991 ). Convergences between semantic and conceptual organization in the preschool 
years. In S.A. Gelman & J.P. Bymes (Eds.), Perspectives on language and thought (pp. 107- 
145). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Wisniewski, E.J., & Medin, D.L. (1991). Harpoons and long sticks: The interaction of theory and 
similarity in rule induction. In D.H. Fisher, M.J. Pazzani, & P. Langley (Eds.), Concept 
]brmation: Knowledge and e_rperience in unsupervised learning. San Mateo, CA: Morgan 
Kaufi~mn. 
